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DEVELOPMENT OR DOMINATION: 
TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
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Introduction 
For the duration of the past ten years (and particularly the latter five of these), 
there has been in South Africa a proliferation of what has popularly been labelled 
"development thinking". During this period "development" has become a catchword 
among academic and quasi-academic researchers, consultants, state and parastatal 
ideologues, and the media; it has, in effect, become a growth industry with its own 
professional hierarchy and career structure. 
The emergence of the concept ~~developmentf~ in this manner can be ascribed 
to the changing needs of the South African state - in particular the need for 
different forms of legitimation - and in that respect it can justifiably be depicted 
as an "incorporative apparatus" of contemporary apartheid ideology. However, given 
the preliminary nature of our research and the complexities of deciphering the form 
and legitimating functions of ideology in South Africa's system of race/capitalism, 
discussion in this paper will be focused on one dimension of the phenomenon 
"development1*: the categories of development "experts" and their attempts to create 
an indigenous methodology of development. (1) 
The concept "development", like the concept segregation in the earlier 
part of the century, is of an amorphous nature and has different meanings to 
different people - a property which undoubtedly contributes to its pervasiveness in 
many sectors of the politico-academic arena. As a concept, moreover, it has 
historically been conflated with the concept of separatism to the extent that 
t'developmenttv has been largely the implementation of the policies of separate 
development in all its multifarious forms. 
What was once the "Native Problem" or "Native Question" - an issue which 
predated the formation of the South African state and which was the subject of 
endless debate by Whites in state and civil society - has assumed a new form. As 
currently described, it is "the inter-group problem", "the problem of multinational 
 development^^, or "the development problem"; in this there is little change in the 
nature of the "problem": it is, in essence, the final outplaying of Verwoerdian . 
apartheid. The "development problem", in somewhat less euphemistic terms, is that 
of Black/separate ltdevelopment". 
The section which follows aims briefly to show that, while the programmes 
and policies of development - which are mostly (and significantly) preoccupied with 
the homelands - may have changed in form, the essentially segregationist and 
repressive nature of the South African state still remains. What is striking in any 
review of the burgeoning literature on "development" in South Africa is the 
ahistorical stance of many of the writers. Few seem to have an awareness of their 
progenitors, and fewer acknowledge that development policies to date have generally 
reinforced rather than ameliorated the plight of the majority of homeland 
inhabitants. 
Historical Antecedents of "Development" 
Territory occupied by the "independent states" and other homelands is usually taken 
as given by planners, academics and state ideologues. This territory - constituting 
a thoroughgoing spatial polarization of inequality among Whites and Africans - with 
some deletion and small-scale pending and actual ttadditionslf (consolidations is the 
favoured term), conforms to the area demarcated by the 1936 Native Land and Trust 
Act. This area - taking the highest estimate - amounted to only 13.7% of the total 
land mass of the Union of South Africa, approximately 2 million hectares less than 
that recommended by the Beaumont Commision almost twenty years earlier. The 
consequent gross shortage of land, exacerbated by increasing population and a 
repressive labour system, made peasant - or even capitalist - agriculture difficult 
if not impossible. (2) 
State policy regarding development in the reserve/homelands - in so far as 
coherent theories and patterns can be observed - can be roughly divided into four 
phases. The first phase, which extended from 1932 to 1948, was initiated by the 
1930-32 Native Economic Commission (NEC). The Commission was significant in that it 
highlighted the deleterious effects of land shortage and its consequent impact on 
the ecology of the homelands. The NEC was not the first state commission to draw 
attention to the situation in the reserves but it was the first to stress the need 
for lpdevelopment". The Commission argued, inter alia, that "in the economic 
development of the reserves must inevitably be sought the main solution for the 
Native economic problem. Our problem is therefore not only as it is in agriculture 
to teach the Natives how to use their land more economically, but is also a race 
against time to prevent the destruction of large grazing areas, the erosion and 
denudation of the soil and the drying up of the springs". (3) The Commission felt 
that the basis for development lay less in the provision of more land than in the 
more effective utilization of existing areas. 
This phase was characterized by an emphasis on reclamation and 
rehabilitation of the reserve areas. This was to be achieved through consolidation 
of the population (wbettermentlf) and limitation of stock. Thus, while Native 
Affairs Department officials were increasingly aware of the conditions in the 
reserves, they believed that the causes were primarily technical, and of these the 
"bad farming" of the peasants was the most crucial. It was a classic manifestation 
of a "blame-the-victim syndromeft. (4) 
The second phase of state policy regarding reserve/homeland "development" 
lasted for the first ten years or so of National Party rule. This period saw a 
bolstering of "betterment" legislation and a greater incorporation of chiefs into 
the state's administrative machinery via the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. In fact, 
the restoration of tribal life and the authority of the chiefs (in effect their 
power to dissipate or control resistance) was one of the terms of reference of the 
Tomlinson Commission, which travelled extensively through the "native reserves" 
during the early 1950s. (5) 
The Tomlinson Commission took cognizance of the extent of deterioration in 
the reserves, but still clung to the notion of distinct African economies which, 
they imagined, could be restored by relieving pressure on land. (6) As a 
consequence, they recommended the abolition of communal land tenure, urbanization of 
half of the peasantry, and an intensive industrialization programme within the 
reserves. The majority of the Commission~s recommendations were nevertheless 
rejected and there was considerable resistance to voting sums of money to implement 
Tomlinson~s plan. Tomlinson had estimated the finance for the first ten years in 
his scheme at £104.5 million, but by 1957 the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development had reduced this estimate by two-thirds to £36.6 million. (7) Thus, the 
first decade or so of National Party rule, if anything, saw even less development 
(or rather maintenance) of the reserves than under United Party rule. 
The third phase of development in the homelands was opened by the 1959 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act and the establishment of the Bantu Investment 
Corporation, and conditioned by heightened rural and urban resistance and increased 
international opposition to apartheid. As a consequence, it was believed that if 
the South African government were to proceed with the separation of the flraces", a
"competitive alternative" to integration was imperative. Such a plan entailed the 
allocation of "a sufficient and coherent territory to serve as a basis for the 
national life of the Bantu" and the provision of "a radical economic development 
providing for industries and economic growth within the Bantu territory ... of 
sufficient scope to bring about the voluntary return to the territory of those now 
earning their living in other parts of the Union". (8) 
From 1959-60 onwards there was a discernible semantic shift from apartheid 
to the notion of "separate  development^^. Verwoerd, for example, informed the 
National Party faithfhl that "separate Bantu development" would be "in line with the 
objects of the world at large". (9) Increasingly, reference was made to "nations", 
'tpeoples" and "ethnic groups" rather than to race. 
The deployment of "separate development" was, however, largely an updating 
of early apartheid. Its primary aim was to divide the Black, especially African, 
opposition by offering a more substantive role to their elites. But the policy 
shift did contain a new element: a passage from direct to indirect rule. An 
administrative petty bourgeoisie drawn partly from the chiefs, and small 
entrepreneurial class, would, it was hoped, provide law and order for a small stake 
in the economy. In this respect the 1963 Transkei Constitution Act, which 
suppposedly accorded self-rule to the Transkei region, was to prove a crucial 
touchstone for the South African state in its approach to the issue of homeland 
lfindependence". 
However, even in terms of its own priorities the state failed to grasp the 
nettle during the 1960s. During this decade, when the South African economy was 
generating a surplus, funds were not invested in the homelands. Only in 1968 were 
the homeland authori.ties and white industries able to allow direct private (White) 
capital investment in these areas. Even then, it was on an agency basis. At the 
same time the Bantu Investment Corporation had little impact on development. Poorly 
funded by the state, it concentrated on loans to enable Africans to acquire from 
Whites or Indians general dealerships, garages and other small-scale enterprises. 
Such investment was not meant to increase production or create jobs, rather to 
perpetuate the idea that the various homelands had their "own" economies. 
The establishment of industrial areas on the white side of homeland 
borders suited industrialists considerably more than the governing elites of the 
homelands. Border industries, using labour subsidized by the homelands, both in 
terms of wages and the costs of social production, actually made the homelands 
poorer. (10) 
The fourth (and present) phase of development strategy dates from the 
early 1970s, when state planners realized the possibility that they were faced, for 
the foreseeable future, with an increasing labour surplus. A heightened labour 
surplus, which was already evident in the late sixties, was generated in part by a 
move to capital intensive machinofacture in all sectors of the economy. It was in 
the agricultural sector, however, that there was the gretest displacement of labour: 
Simkins, for example, estimated that between 1960 and 1980 there was a net 
emigration of 1.3 million people from White farms. (11) 
Since 1960, more systematic influx control and resettlement policies 
actually reversed immigration into urban centres to a slight net emigration at a 
time when continued immigration might have been predicted by theories of economic 
development. (12) This retardation of black urbanization, the displacement of farm 
labour and continuing tfrelocation" of "black spots" help to explain a "net 
immigration" to the homelands whose population share increased from 40 per cent in 
1960 to 53 per cent in 1980. (13) 
The post-1960 system set up pressures which were mostly administratively 
contained, but by the early 1970s these apparatuses were being placed under 
increasing strain - a strain which could not be contained solely by a larger 
bureaucracy. New strategies were needed to (a) legitimize and facilitate increased 
resettlement in the homelands; (b) ensure that people stayed on the land; and (c) 
refine the methods of control and co-optation of urban Blacks. It is in this 
context that the granting of homeland "independencett o Transkei, Bophutatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei between 1976 and 1981 should be viewed. 
The central thrust of homeland independence as far as the South African 
state was concerned thus was to exclude as many urban Blacks as possible from South 
African citizenship. "As far as political aspirations are concerned", comments the 
1983 South African Yearbook, "the Government makes no distinction between urban 
Blacks and their compatriots in the self-governing national states ..." (14) 
As part of an attempt to seek international recognition of the homelands 
and its discriminating practices in general, the state since 1979 has been talking 
in terms of an economic constellation of southern African states (CONSAS). Despite 
the subsequent rejection by the Frontline States of overtures of closer economic co- 
operation, the existence of CONSAS (albeit largely on paper) helps perpetuate the 
fiction of the "independent" homelands. In addition, the extensive use of the term 
"co~peration~~ in rhetoric associated with these proposals is suggestive of an 
interaction between two or more parties, that is that the homelands are autonomous 
entities. 
The 1981 Good Hope Plan for Southern Africa is an elaboration of the 
CONSAS proposals. While there appears to be a shift away from the myth of the 
self-contained nature of the "independenttt homelands, in the emphasis on the notion 
that "the whole of Southern Africa should be seen as comprising a number of broadly 
defined development regions which could include segments of various independent 
states", it is perhaps worth noting that the term ttSouthern Africatr refers in effect 
to South Africa and her homelands. (The eight proposed development regions are all 
parts of South ~frica.) (15) 
The real thrust of the Good Hope Plan, however, as with previous less 
I sophisticated strategies, is to keep Blacks out of White urban areas by promoting an 
extensive investment programme in the "independent national statestt. Even assuming 
political will on the part of the state to underwrite such a venture, the cost of 
promoting development programmes in such disadvantaged regions is likely to be 
astronomical. For example, it has been estimated that the aggregate cost of 
financial concessions to industries operating in the Transkei during 1982/83 
amounted to R13 million or R1,000 a year per worker employed. (16) In view of this, 
it is doubtful whether the state in its present fiscal crisis could undertake 
anything more than a holding operation in the homelands. 
The Current Development "Debate" 
The contemporary development "debateff in South Africa is thus in reality a chimera, 
since the parameters of the discourse, as indicated, are still rigidly defined by 
the apartheid system. No contra-position on development by Blacks is admitted for 
discussion and they are, for the most part, totally excluded from the "debate". 
Theory, hence, is not generated by Blacks but for Blacks, and the concept 
"de~elopment~~ becomes almost by definition "Black development". The boundaries of 
development activity are thus coincident with those of the homelands, since there is 
no officially recognized "Black development" outside these regions. 
The participants in the Ifdebate" are, however, a heterogeneous group 
representing the interests of the state, different sectors of the capitalist 
economy, as well as involving various species of "organic" intellectuals. The 
complex mobile ensemble of discourses and practices regarding tfdevelopmenttl can be 
loosely delineated into three categories, as follows: (a) ethno-nationalism, 
(b) liberal-reformism, and (c) technocracy. The categories are not, however, 
mutually exclusive and the practices and pronouncements of individual actors do not 
necessarily always coincide with the category in which they would seem most 
"10gically~~ to be located. Thus, while the objectives of ethno-nationalists and 
liberal-reformists would not, as a rule, overlap, it is likely that they will find 
common grounds in technocracy since they both to an extent help constitute and 
perpetuate this ttcategoryff. 
Ethno-Nationalists 
Adherents of the ethno-nationalist school are located largely, but not exclusively, 
in Afrikaans-medium and ethnic universities and among the ranks of state ideologues. 
Their theories, which bear elements of uvolkekundell (17), represent the most cogent 
attempt to develop an indigenous discoirse on development. The writings of this 
group endeavour to refurbish the theories of separate development by the 
appropriation and bastardization of western scoiological theories of pluralism and 
ethnicity, and lately by the adaptation of international theories of development. 
It is from this school of theorists that much of state policy vis a vis 
Black development is drawn. This in itself is not surprising, since several of the 
most prominent academic or quasi-academic research agencies are part of the state 
machinery; these include the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). In addition, the linkage between 
theory and policy formulation is further assured by a significant Broederbond 
presence among practitioners of and writers on development. (18) 
The attempts of the ethno-nationalists to generate a methodology of 
development are as much an attempt to legitimize the unfoldings of the policies of 
separate development. This on occasion descends to the level of subtle 
propagandizing, as evident in the invocation of the failures of Black AFrica in 
comparison with South Africa and its homelands. Dr P Smit, then Chairman of the 
Africa Institute, in his annual report for 1981, states, for example: 
Both Africa and South Africa today differ greatly from 
what political leaders expected 21 years ago. 
Statistical data could be presented in an attempt to 
show to what extent the average black African is 
better or worse off than in 1960. Such an exercise, 
however, would not greatly enhance our understanding 
of reality. Certainly it is far more difficult and 
dangerous to travel across Africa today than before 
independence, standards of public administration, 
rural health services, telecommunications and other 
services have generally declined; almost everywhere 
one can feel an ominous worsening with respect to food 
supplies, employment, public indebtedness, balance of 
payment, rural-urban disparities, availability of 
consumer goods, and so forth. (19) 
The cruder variants of ethno-nationalist theory expand on this idea by alluding to 
the Christian civilizing role of Whites (and increasingly non-Africans) in South . 
Africa and the continent of Africa. Professor Van Wyk of Potchefstroom University, 
for example, in referring to the compatibility between the basic needs approach and 
Christian beliefs, states: 
It is a general belief that South Africa has a great 
number of Christians of all races and in all walks of 
life. Surely, this will be a matter of such 
importance to the Christians that they will regard 
this as one of the opportunities to be of service in 
the Kingdom of God. The fact remains that it will 
take a concerted effort by everybody in South Africa 
to adopt an attitude of responsibility: the rich to 
help the poor: the poor to accept it but at the 
same time to be ready to contribute to their own 
affairs. (20) 
Under this rubric there is a strong appeal to ttcommon sense" and to the observable 
realities of events in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa. Illustrative of this 
approach are the remarks of Professor Stoffel van der Merwe of the Rand Afrikaans 
University, who avers that: 
If one concedes the slightest amount of good 
intentions - or at least enlightened self-interest - 
on the side of the government, a completely different 
interpretation can be given to the facts. The black 
areas in South Africa undoubtedly belong to the third 
world and suffer from the same problems as the rest of 
Africa. The problems of development encountered in 
the black areas of South Africa are in all respects 
comparable to the problems experienced in the rest of 
Africa. It is a well known fact that despite all 
efforts to develop Africa the gap between the 
developed countries and third world continues to 
widen. (21) 
In the absence of any normative paradigm of development (other than that 
of separation), the contradictory twists of the path towards a theory of homeland 
development make heavy going for even the most consummate ethno-nationalist 
theorist. The process has involved a co-option of terminology and concepts which is 
often antithetical to the objectives of the theories whence they were borrowed. 
What emerges from this convolution of ideas is a pseudo-theory of development 
embracing a variety of often divergent perspectives. 
Such an approach is exemplified in the following passage by D A Kotze, 
Professor of Development Administration at the University of South Africa: 
Development Administration should take from various 
disciplines certain aspects that have influence on or 
are relevant to the subject moulding them and 
integrating them in this adapted form into its own 
newly structured field of study. Development 
Administration accordingly develops its own new field 
by means of modified and adapted subject content from 
related disciplines, in order effectively to examine 
and deal with the unique development administrative 
problems of Africans. In this way a single, though 
complex, yet new and integrated totality is evolved as 
a field of study from related data. From the inside 
of this new subject, the various aspects in its 
subject content are now viewed differently - since 
they have meanwhile undergone some modification - from 
what it used to be in the related disciplines as seen 
from the outside. For the sake of convenience this 
premise can be typified as an integrated totality 
approach. ( 22) 
Underlying the ethno-nationalist perspective is a strong current of structural 
functionalism which reflects itself in a lack of concern with causal (historical) 
explanations of social systems and social change. The approach tends to view any 
.given homeland as a systemic whole, the components of which are functionally 
inter-dependent and to an extent self-regulatory. Such causality as is allowed is 
confined within the system, which tends to react to, rather than be determined by, 
external forces. 
The apolitical stance of the "systems approachft to rural development 
clearly illustrates this aspect. A recent report (23) on the problems of 
agricultural development in the Transkei, for example, identifies "three interacting 
forces which in combination, determine the type of farming system being practised in 
a given agro-ecological areaft. These were: (i) physical forces and the 
environment, (ii) the human, practical and (iii) institutional framework (i.e. 
agricultural policy, marketing, extension, etc). From the perspective of the 
tlsystems approachf1 thus, the retardation of agricultural growth is determined by 
constraints within the homelands themselves. 
The structural functionalist approach is also interwoven with earlier 
theories of modernization, which are residual in much of current development 
thinking. Two facets of the modernization thesis which emerge in contemporary 
development writing are: (a) the role of the elite (now called "leaderstt/ 
professionals) in the process of social transformation, and (b) the dualistic nature 
of the South African political economy. 
(a) The importance of "leaders" is explicit in the institution of chieftainship 
previously mentioned, but it is also, and perhaps more importantly, prevalent 
in attempts to stimulate the growth of a Black middle class of entrepreneurs 
and professionals. 
(b) The dualistic perspective is evident in the depiction of the homelands as a 
series of distinct but unitary economies requiring their own course and pace 
of development. (24) In this connection it must be noted that the 
introduction of the strategy of inter-regional development (cf The Good Hope 
plan) (25), despite its apparent shift away from the notion of independent 
homeland economies, represents in actuality a reformulation of the industrial 
decentralization policy (26) rather than a conceptual volte-face. 
The notion of dualism, as explicated in much of the contemporary writing, envisages 
disparate development paths for the homelands and for White South Africa. This is 
implicit in the propagation of such notions as self-help, informal sector employment 
and appropriate technology, which are seen as peculiar to the homelands and to 
Blacks in general. 
The ethno-nationalist perspective on development, however, is by no means 
static and has in recent years shown a considerable capacity to transform (update) 
itself; it is in part a discourse and has an internal momentum of its own. 
Liberal Reformists 
The liberal-reformist perspective on development is far less prevalent than that of 
the ethno-nationalists. The approach, in essence, emerges from the old school of 
liberalism, although the proponents of this view in general reflect more 
social-democratic leanings than did their forebears, C S Richards, S H Frankel, 
H M Robertson, and others. 
Liberal-reformism, which is evident in the research institutes in many 
English media universities, allows for the possibility of development, and in that 
its reformism is not markedly different from that of the official parliamentary 
opposition. The approach, which contains a call for reason, emphasises the 
importance of gradualism and the power of persuasion to remove obstacles to 
development. 
Whilst the standpoint of this school is not necessarily accommodative of the 
existing political dispensation, it does for the most part recognise (if it does not 
accept) the limitations of separate development and attempts to manoeuvre within 
those parameters. The passage by Jill Nattrass, cited below, is indicative of this 
general approach: 
There are indeed a number of factors in the 
application of a basic needs approach in the South 
African context which suggest that enlightened self 
interest of the white groups as well as that of the 
Black leaders in the National States will be well 
served by the introduction of such a strategy. 
These are: 
1. From the viewpoint of the white leadership, a 
basic needs approach to development is compatible 
with the cause of separate development. Indeed 
one must argue that its implementation could act 
as a justification for the policy in the sense 
that the basic needs approach requires the 
identification of the areas in need in the 
country as well as some decentralisation of the 
government, both of which have occurred as the 
policy of separate development has been 
implemented. 
2. From the viewpoint of the wealthier groups who 
will have to bear the costs of such development, 
as a result of the emphasis the basic needs 
approach'Flaces upon the mobilisation of local 
development resources and participation, it is 
highly likely to yield greater returns in the 
form of development generated per tax and 
transferred, than any other alternative 
development strategy. 
3. From the viewpoint of the Black elite in the 
National States, the strategy is politically 
attractive since it shows the leadership to be 
interested in the welfare of the poorest groups. 
4. In the South African context, the funds for such 
development come into the National States in the 
form of a transfer from the central government so 
the cost of development to the elites within 
these States is negligible. Indeed Black 
commercial and industrial leaders in these areas 
stand to gain substantially from the successful 
implementation of a basic needs strategy. 
In terms of these arguments, it does seem that there 
is no reason why the basic needs approach should not 
be adopted in South Africa. (27) 
A central tenet of the liberal-reformist approach but one by no means 
universally propagated is its belief in the power of market forces to improve 
quality of life among the poor of South Africa and the homelands. (28) It is seen 
as important thus to extend the free market to Blacks and to allow them "equal 
opportunities" to whites. This line of thinking is also strongly advocated by 
the English and, to a lesser extent, the Afrikaans media. 
Technocrats 
The third identifiable group, the technocrats, is in part a pseudo category, since 
it is informed by the other two ideological tendencies. Thus, while the technocrats 
swear allegiance to no specific ideology and hold the promise of neutrality in the 
development arena, in practice they generally serve one or other camp. 
Implicit in their work and assumptions is the feasibility of 
"developmentn, provided the correct techno-economic mix can be found. This 
apparently neutral standpoint has in effect created a meeting space for ethno- 
nationalist and liberal-reformist in an avowedly non-political atmosphere. It is 
likely as a consequence of this that the technocratic tendency is the fastest 
growing of the three discussed, including, as it does, the plethora of consultants 
operating within and without the homelands. Thus, while possessing its own 
adherents within the ranks of academics, its primary function would appear to be the 
provision of a forum for disparate interest groups. 
The province of technocratic operation is marked by an amalgam of 
development concepts and a broad lexicon of developmental terminology. The 
strategies propagated by technocrats which reflect the diversity of the interest 
groups they represent include, inter alia, the concepts of self-help, self- 
sufficiency, community development, labour intensity (versus capital intensity), 
settlement on the land, appropriate technology, informal sector employment and basic 
needs, in addition to a broad range of engineering strategies. 
Whilst obviously not all of the above concepts are universally propagated, 
several of them bear special consideration in that they embody a technocratic belief 
in the notion of a value-free and depoliticised process of development. For the 
purposes of discussion it will be of relevance to consider two of these concepts and 
their intended applications. 
Appropriate Technology 
The concept of appropriate technology has become something of a catch phrase in much 
development literature: a sine qua non in many strategies for rural development. 
Yet, whatever the validity of this approach (and it appears questionable), it is 
perhaps one of the most misappropriated of all the newly adopted concepts. In the 
South African context it has become separated from its Gandhian and Schumacherian 
philosophical origins, which advocate, in addition to simpler technologies, a 
significant reduction in the wealth and consumption of the affluent and the pursuit 
of a less materialistic life-style. The adoption of more appropriate technologies 
(which cannot merely be seen as forces of production) thus implies the adoption of 
more "appropriate" lifestyles, which, they believe, would be more conducive to an 
egalitarian society. 
The advocates of appropriate technology in South Africa, however, are 
amongst the most technocratic in the entire development domain, having depoliticized 
the concept to an extreme. This is, for example, illustrated in a newsletter issued 
by the then Centre for Appripriate Technology at the University of Port Elizabeth,' 
which is remarkable for its ahistoricism. Referring to the conditions of 
underdevelopment and poverty in rural areas, the communication suggests that: 
People in the rural traditional areas are indirectly 
forced out of their self-supportive activities by 
modern technology over the years. The only 
alternative for these people was and still is to move 
to an urban centre or growthpole to be employed in 
large scale production units. The large scale of 
modern technology is of such a nature that people are 
forced out of a self-reliant way of existence to a 
state of dependency. It is only the rich and powerful 
who can undertake new productive enterprises on this 
scale. People of small means are thus excluded from 
entrepreneurship and reduced to the position of job 
seekers. This exclusion manifests itself further in 
the fact that the largest share of government 
expenditure over the past two decades has been 
directed to the relatively affluent modern 
manufacturing and commercial sectors of the cities, 
while only a fraction has been directed to rural 
development, where the majority of the poor live. In 
this way not only the self-reliance of a community is 
reduced by the expanding activities of the modern 
sector, but the community is also placed in a spiral 
that leads to the uprooting of people in rural 
areas. (30) 
The problem of rural poverty in the homelands and its perpetuation thus is reduced 
to one of an incorrect technological mix, large-scale as against small, capital 
versus labour intensity. 
A variant of this theme is that not only must technologies be introduced 
which are more appropriate to rural communities but the peasants must also be 
encouraged to simplify their lifestyles. (31) The ironies inherent in this 
suggestion cannot be overlooked: appropriate technology is principally for Blacks, 
and in particular rural Blacks who are, in any event, the poorest of the poor in 
South Africa. Furthermore, if followed to its logical conclusion, i.e. without an 
equivalent simplification of life-styles on the,part of White South Africa, which is 
advancing rapidly into a world of microchips and automation (321, the existent 
disparities between urban (White) and rural (Black) areas is likely to grow rather 
than diminish. 
Back to the Land 
Closely linked to the concept of appropriate technology is the proposition that 
Blacks should be encouraged (in practice, forced if necessary) to return to the land 
and remain there. Numerous academic and consultant reports point to the 
agricultural potentialities of the homelands and recommend the promotion of 
small-scale farming and self-sufficiency in the production of food. (33) In this, 
the advocacies of the technocrats and the state are entirely coincident. (It was 
intimated previously, for example, that as early as 1936 and the Land Trust Act, it 
has been the policy of successive governments to encourage Blacks to remain in the 
homelands and on the land.) Thus, despite increasing levels of rural over- 
crowding (34) in many homelands, escalating soil erosion, the declining 
profitability of agricultural yield and the massive outflow of migrant labour, 
substantial increases in productivity are still forecast. Contemporary attempts, 
including the removal of squatters, to resettle people, however, in reality are not 
substantially different from the betterment schemes of the 1950s and early 1960s, 
with the notable exception that they are couched in the terminology of contemporary 
development theory. 
Where the deterioration of agricultural output is admitted, it is ascribed 
to socio-cultural constraints within the homelands rather than to external econo- 
political forces: 
More and more experts are maintaining that the 
development of agriculture in the Black areas is as 
much a sociological problem as it is an economic or 
technological one. 
These characteristics and the status of the Blacks in 
their tribal community explains why those Blacks who 
have worked under the guidance of white farmers for 
years and often rendered outstanding services fall 
back into their traditional way of life and low 
productivity as soon as they return to their 
homelands. (35) 
Both the above concepts find common reference in the international literature of 
development and have coherence in one or other developing nation. They become 
particularly contentious when they are deployed (in a purportedly value-free manner) 
within the econo-political framework of South Africa. 
Conclusion 
The attempt to develop an indigenous discourse on development is obviously still 
very much in progress. What is of note is the fact that the ffdebate'f, so-called, is 
becoming increasingly more sophisticated in comparison to the crude formulations of 
the early ethno-nationalists. In particular, there is an attempt'at reification and 
professionalization of the concept. This is, for example, evident in the recent 
establishment of a Development Association for South Africa and an Appropriate 
Technology Association, which, in the eyes of some, will formalise the entire 
debate. 
The cause of the development movement has also been considerably 
strengthened by the foundation, in June 1983, of the Development Bank of South 
Africa. The Bank is not only assuming responsibility for the financing of 
development projects in the independent homelands (thereby supposedly diminishing 
direct dependence on the state) but also, more importantly for this discussion, it 
is providing a focal point for those "interested in development", by producing a 
development journal and by hosting conferences and funding directed research. 
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